A meta-analysis, a review, and an experiment investigated the effect of arousal on attraction. The meta-analysis examined experiments that manipulated arousal level. Results indicated that arousal affects attraction even when the arousal source is relatively unambiguous. In contrast, a review of experiments that manipulated arousal source ambiguity suggested that arousal exerts a stronger influence on attraction when arousal sources are greater in ambiguity. The authors proposed a judgment and adjustment model that states that arousal automatically affects judgments of attraction but that individuals can correct (i.e., adjust) for this automatic effect when the arousal source is unambiguous. Consistent with this model, an experiment provided evidence that cognitive busyness interferes with the adjustment process.
Meyer stands at one end of a 450-ft suspension bridge located in a British Columbian park. The bridge is made of wooden planks attached to wire cables and spans a deep canyon. Like many who visit the park, Meyer decides to test his nerve by crossing the narrow bridge. When he reaches the middle, a gust of wind causes the bridge to sway, and he glances down at the jagged rocks and swirling water 200 ft below. When Meyer looks up again, he notices an attractive woman. Under different circumstances, Meyer might have been only moderately attracted to her, but in his aroused state he is strongly attracted to her. He introduces himself to her and later asks for her phone number. They date, fall in love, and eventually marry.
Research suggests that if Meyer had been crossing a lower, wooden bridge instead of the suspension bridge, he would have been less attracted to the woman (Dutton & Aron, 1974) . Why should crossing a swaying suspension bridge, as opposed to a sturdy one, increase Meyer's level of attraction to another individual? Arousal has been used as the explanatory construct. Perhaps Meyer did not think about the bridge and reasoned that he was attracted to the woman because she made him feel aroused. Alternatively, perhaps the presence of the woman alleviated Meyer's fear (and his arousal level), and her attractiveness was enhanced by associating her with the removal of aversive fear. Finally, the arousal associated with crossing the bridge may have strengthened Meyer's romantic attraction, which is his usual, or dominant, response to meeting an attractive woman. The above three descriptions exemplify three prominent theories that have been proposed to account for the effect of arousal on attraction.
Originally, Dutton and Aron (1974) proposed that misattribution theory explains the effect of arousal on attraction. This theory is based on Schachter's theory of emotion (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) , which states that emotion is the result of physiological arousal followed by a cognitive label for that arousal. An extension of this theory suggests that ambiguous arousal resulting from one source may be misattributed to another source. Specifically, mis attribution theory proposes that arousal resulting from one source may be misattributed to an attractive opposite-sex member, leading to greater attraction. 1 To test this theory, Dutton and Aron (1974, Experiment 1) used a design that is typical of research investigating the effect of arousal on attraction and of the experiments included in this meta-analysis. Participants in one condition were aroused (i.e., by crossing the suspension bridge), whereas participants in a control condition were not aroused but were engaged in a similar procedure (i.e., crossing a low stable bridge). Following this manipulation, participants' attraction to a target individual was measured. The difference between the attraction of the aroused group and the attraction of the control group represents the influence of arousal on attraction.
As an alternative to misattribution theory, Kenrick and Cialdini (1977) suggested that negative-reinforcement theory explains the effect of arousal on attraction. In a theoretical review, they argued that previous arousal inductions typically involved fear (e.g., crossing a suspension bridge, expecting strong electric shocks). Under such conditions, the presence of another may be instrumental in removing an individual's fear-based arousal (Schachter, 1959; Wrightsman, 1960) . The target relieves the perceiver's uncomfortable fear-based arousal and thereby acts as a negative reinforcer, which causes perceivers to enhance their judgments of the target's attractiveness.
More recently, Allen, Kenrick, Linder, and McCall (1989) suggested that response-facilitation theory offers the most parsimonious explanation of the effect of arousal on attraction. In the tradition of Ilullian theory (Hull, 1943 ) and Zajonc's social facilitation research (1965) , Allen and his colleagues proposed that arousal heightens a specific dominant response for a given interpersonal attraction context. In particular, they proposed that "(a) liking is the dominant response to a same-sex person sharing an aversive environment, (b) romantic attraction is the dominant response toward a good-looking potential date, and (c) aversion is the dominant response to an unattractive potential date" (Allen et al., 1989, p. 261) .
Why is it important to understand the relation between arousal and attraction? The relation between arousal and attraction has been explained with three theories, each grounded in a unique tradition: attribution, reinforcement, and facilitation. The arousal-attraction link provides an opportunity to assess and compare the utility of these broader theoretical orientations. Demonstrating that misattribution (Dutton & Aron, 1974) best explains the relation between arousal and attraction would further support Schachter's theory of emotion (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) and information-based models of affect and cognition (Schwarz, 1990) . Demonstrating that negative reinforcement best explains the relation between arousal and attraction (Kenrick & Cialdini, 1977) would emphasize the importance of the environment and conditioning in attraction and in social perception more generally. Finally, demonstrating that response facilitation best explains the relation between arousal and attraction (Allen et al., 1989) would suggest that typical or dominant responses may influence a plethora of affective and cognitive responses inherent in interpersonal judgment.
A Meta-Analysis of Arousal and Attraction Research
A meta-analytic review of the literature was conducted in an effort to (a) examine empirically the magnitude of the effect of arousal on attraction, (b) determine which variables moderate the effect of arousal on attraction, and (c) determine which theory, if any, is best supported by analyses involving moderating variables. Although an abundance of data exists regarding the relation between arousal and attraction, results have been inconclusive. As Bern noted, "experimental attempts to determine which explanation is the most valid have produced mixed results and the dispute is not yet settled" (1996, p. 326) .
Moderators
Experiments that manipulated arousal between participants and measured participants' attraction to another person (the target) were coded for several potential moderators relevant to the three prominent theories of arousal and attraction.
Arousal Source Ambiguity
Arousal source ambiguity refers to the degree to which individuals perceive their experience of arousal as caused by the true arousal source. Traditionally, the arousal and attraction literature has used the term salience to describe this causal inference. We think that arousal source ambiguity is the preferable term, because it is more theoretically precise than arousal source salience. Salience refers only to the ability of a stimulus to capture the attention of the individual (Taylor & Fiske, 1975) .
Target Attractiveness
Target attractiveness refers to the physical attractiveness of the target. Targets were generally reported to be of high, average, or low attractiveness.
Arousal Type
Arousal type refers to how arousal was manipulated experimentally. Typically, fear has been used to create arousal in participants (Allen et al., 1989; Dienstbier, 1979; Dutton & Aron, 1974; Kenrick, Cialdini, & Linder, 1979; Riordan, 1984; Riordan & Tedeschi, 1983) . However, other arousal manipulations include having participants exercise (Allen et al., 1989; White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981; White & Kight, 1984) or exposing participants to sexual material (Carducci, Cozby, & Ward, 1978; Griffitt, May, & Veitch, 1974; Istvan, Griffitt, & Weidner, 1983; Stephan, Berscheid, & Walster, 1971) .
Target Sex
Target sex refers to whether targets were of the same sex or opposite sex as the participant. Target sex does not refer to whether the target was male or female.
Predictions
To test each of the three predominant arousal-attraction theories, we elucidated the predictions each theory advances in regard to the potential moderators. This step allowed us to clarify and organize existing predictions and to extract further predictions from each theory. All predictions were (a) stated clearly by the authors (i.e., explicit) or (b) inferred from the broader context of the theory (i.e., implicit). Figure 1 displays the predictions each theory advances regarding the moderating variables.
Misattribution Theory: Explicit Predictions
Two of the four predictions based on misattribution theory were stated clearly by Dutton and Aron (1974) . First, misattribution theory predicts that any type of arousal will be sufficient to affect attraction. Dutton and Aron (1974) refer to earlier research, noting that "strong emotions are relabeled as sexual attraction whenever an acceptable object is present" (p. 511). This prediction is also consistent with Schachter's conceptualization of emotion as physiological arousal accompanied by a cognitive label. The implication of this theory is that every strong emotion has an arousal component which can be misattributed. Second, misattribution theory predicts that target sex will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction (see footnote 1): "The present series of experiments is designed to test the notion that an attractive female is seen as more attractive by males who encounter her while they experience a strong emotion (fear) than by males not experiencing a strong emotion" (Dutton&Aron, 1974, p. 511) .
Misattribution Theory: Implicit Predictions
Misattribution theory predicts implicitly that only arousal coming from ambiguous sources will affect attraction. Schachter stated, Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation (e.g., "I feel this way because I have just received an injection of adrenaline'') no evaluative needs will arise, and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available. (1964, p. 53) Similarly, Kenrick and Cialdini (1977) noted that "the idea originally developed by Schachter and Singer (1962; Schachter, 1964) was that a state of unexplainable internal arousal would be labeled in accordance with its context" (pp. 386-387). Additionally, Allen and his colleagues (1989) stated that misattribution theory predicts that ' 'arousal will affect attraction only if they [participants] are unaware of the true source of their arousal" (p. 262). Dutton and Aron's (1974) original description of misattribution theory differed from these subsequent interpretations. They acknowledged that research suggests "a sexual attractionstrong emotion link may occur even when the emotions are unambiguous" (Dutton & Aron, 1974, p. 511) . Despite this qualification, we refer to the traditional interpretation of misattribution theory: that only arousal resulting from ambiguous sources will affect attraction. We prefer this stricter interpretation of misattribution theory for two reasons. First, subsequent theories have attempted to explain how arousal affects attraction when arousal sources are unambiguous. Ignoring this issue means not examining the most important theoretical difference between misattribution theory and more recent theories. Second, Schachter's theory of emotion (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) states clearly that only ambiguous arousal should be misattributed. Limiting the role of arousal source ambiguity renders it unclear which predictions can be derived from Schachter's theory. For these reasons, we examined the misattribution theory prediction that arousal source ambiguity will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. Nevertheless, Dutton and Aron's caveat remains important and will be addressed later.
Misattribution theory does not advance clear predictions regarding target attractiveness. It is unclear whether targets of average or low attractiveness appear to be potential sources of arousal and, therefore, whether any arousal experienced in the presence of such targets will be misattributed. It can be assumed that arousal will make attractive targets appear more attractive. It also seems unlikely that arousal will be misattributed to targets of low attractiveness and thereby make them appear more attractive. Therefore, we argue that misattribution theory predicts that target attractiveness will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. We also acknowledge that misattribution theory can explain several results involving targets of neutral attractiveness.
Negative-Reinforcement Theory: Explicit Predictions
Three out of four predictions based on negative-reinforcement theory were stated clearly by the authors (Kenrick & Cialdini, 1977) . First, negative-reinforcement theory predicts that arousal source ambiguity will not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. "Whether an individual is or is not fully aware of the sources of his internal autonomic distress, the bulk of the data suggests that it is the reduction of this aversive arousal that is associated with strengthening interpersonal bonds, including heterosexual attraction" (Kenrick & Cialdini, 1977, p. 389 ). Second, negative-reinforcement theory predicts that arousal type will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. As is evident in the aforementioned quote, Kenrick and Cialdini argued that it is reduction of aversive arousal that will lead to reinforcement. Third, negative-reinforcement theory predicts that target sex will not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. Kenrick and Cialdini wrote that "a reinforcement position would predict similar results for male and female confederates (i.e., fear-based arousal should result in increased attraction for targets, regardless of sex)" (pp. 389-390).
Negative-Reinforcement Theory: Implicit Predictions
The remaining prediction for negative-reinforcement theory is clear from principles of reinforcement. We argue that negativereinforcement theory predicts that target attractiveness will not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. The presence of a target during an aversive situation should be reinforcing regardless of the target's physical attractiveness. Therefore, negativereinforcement theory would have to be qualified to accommodate results in which target attractiveness moderated the effect of arousal on attraction.
Response-Facilitation Theory; Explicit Predictions
All four predictions based on response-facilitation theory were stated explicitly by the authors (Allen et al., 1989) . First, response-facilitation theory predicts that arousal source ambiguity will not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction: "Response facilitation predicts that aroused subjects will be more attracted to a target person than will nonaroused subjects regardless of the salience of the actual source of arousal" (Allen et al., 1989, p. 262) . Second, response-facilitation theory predicts that target attractiveness will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. Two of the assumed dominant responses were "(b) that romantic attraction is the dominant response toward a goodlooking potential date and (c) that aversion is the dominant response to an unattractive potential date" (p. 262). Third, response-facilitation theory predicts that arousal type will not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction: "From the response-facilitation perspective, it does not matter whether the arousal is induced by threat of shock, a suspension bridge, exercise, a shot of adrenaline, a snort of cocaine, or a cup of coffee" (p. 262). Fourth, response-facilitation theory predicts that target sex will moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. The basis for this prediction is seen in the third assumed dominant response: "Liking is the dominant response to a same-sex person sharing an aversive environment" (p. 262).
Summary of Predictions
Nine of twelve predictions were addressed explicitly when the particular arousal-attraction theory was introduced. One prediction attributable to negative-reinforcement theory was inferred from principles of conditioning and reinforcement. Another prediction, based on mis attribution theory, was inferred from Schachter's theory of emotion (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) . Only one prediction was not derived directly from theory. We argue that misattribution theory predicts that arousal will increase attraction to attractive targets but that the effect of arousal on attraction when targets are of average or low attractiveness remains unclear.
Dependent Variables
We investigated the effect of arousal on romantic attraction, physical attractiveness, and liking. Dutton and Aron (1989) suggested that arousal will increase romantic attraction to targets but will not affect liking for targets. Negative-reinforcement theory, proposed as an alternative to misattribution theory, also suggests that arousal will increase romantic attraction. We assumed that negative-reinforcement theory also predicts that fearbased arousal will increase liking for targets, because this theory is based on research that demonstrated that fear enhances affiliative tendencies toward others (Schachter, 1959; Wrightsman, 1960) . Response-facilitation theory predicts that arousal will increase romantic attraction toward, but not liking of, oppositesex targets of high attractiveness. In addition, response-facilitation theory predicts that arousal will increase liking for samesex targets sharing an aversive environment.
Misattribution theory, negative-reinforcement theory, and response-facilitation theory do not make explicit predictions regarding the effect of arousal on perceived physical attractiveness. Physical attractiveness refers to evaluations of the target's physical appearance rather than the desire to become romantically involved with the target. We assumed that none of the theories predicts that arousal exerts differential effects on perceived physical attractiveness and romantic attraction because physical attractiveness is a central component of romantic attraction (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986) .
Method

Sample of Experiments
Experiments appropriate for the meta-analysis were obtained in the following ways: (a) We searched PsycLIT (1974 PsycLIT ( -1995 , Sociofile (1974 Sociofile ( -1995 , and Dissertation Abstracts , first using the keywords arousal and attraction and again using the keywords arousal and attractiveness; (b) we searched the 1950 through 1973 issues of Psychological Abstracts for articles that used arousal and attraction or interpersonal attraction as keywords; (c) we searched the reference sections of review articles relevant to arousal and attraction research (Aron & Aron, 1996; Berscheid & Walster, 1974 Cotton, 1981; Reisenzein, 1983) ; and (d) we searched the reference sections of all included articles for additional relevant articles. When these searches were completed, the meta-analysis included 16 articles and 3 dissertations that yielded a total of 33 experiments that met the appropriate criteria. Within only the romantic attraction category, the obtained results were based on approximately 1,232 participants.
Criteria for Inclusion
Manipulation of arousal. Misattribution theory and response-facilitation theory suggest that any type of physiological arousal may enhance attraction. Consequently, we included any clear manipulation of arousal that did not manipulate characteristics of the target concurrently. Arousal generally was induced through fear-eliciting stimuli, exercise, or sexually arousing stimuli. Arousal was also induced by loud bursts of noise (Kenrick & Johnson, 1979) , negative-ion concentration (Baron, 1987) , a grisly description of a killing (White et al., 1981) , humor (White et al., 1981) , expectation of accomplishment (Aron, 1970) , or effectance arousal (Byrne & Clore, 1967) .
Target. Targets must have been specific individuals to whom participants could be attracted. The basis of our criteria was to include targets of sufficient variety to examine predictions and maintain a suitable number of experiments for the meta-analysis. Targets were presented as an actual person, a person on a videotape, a person in a photograph, a written description of a person, or a symbolic representation of a person.
Targets were of high attractiveness, average attractiveness, or low attractiveness, and were of the same sex or the opposite sex as the participant. All experiments that manipulated arousal also met the target criterion.
Dependent variable. A third requirement for inclusion was the measurement of attraction to the target. The basis for our criteria was to provide sufficient breadth to include several experiments while remaining within the domain of interpersonal attraction. We included measures of romantic attraction, physical attractiveness, and liking because these dependent measures indicate some form of interpersonal attraction to the target. Furthermore, response-facilitation theory (Allen et el., 1989) made specific predictions regarding the dependent measures of liking and romantic attraction. Romantic attraction refers to a desire to be romantically involved with the target (e.g., "How much would you like to date the target?''). Physical attractiveness refers to the appearance of the target (e.g., rating the target on a scale ranging from ugly to beautiful). When a composite scale containing both romantic attraction and physical attractiveness items was used (e.g.. White & Kight, 1984) , the scale was placed in the category of romantic attraction if results for the specific items were not available. The liking category refers to how much the participant liked the target (e.g., "How much do you like the target?
1 '). Forms of Byrne's (1971) Interpersonal Judgment Scale were included in the liking category. We excluded participants' ratings of the target's traits or characteristics, because these measures do not necessarily reflect attraction. Participants may perceive a target to be friendly but not experience greater liking for that target.
Calculating Effect Sizes
We calculated effect sizes by subtracting the mean attraction of nonaroused participants from the mean attraction of aroused participants. That difference was then divided by an estimated standard deviation. Effect sizes were corrected for bias, which occurs primarily when the sample size is small. The corrected effect sizes were weighted during analyses to produce the final effect size estimate, d+ (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . Positive effect sizes indicate that arousal increased attraction, whereas negative effect sizes indicate that arousal decreased attraction. Effect size estimates are bounded by a 95% confidence interval unless otherwise noted. Some experiments provided multiple effect sizes because variables in addition to arousal were manipulated. For example, an experiment manipulating both arousal and target attractiveness (high, neutral, and low) may provide three effect sizes, one for each level of target attractiveness.
The standard deviation used to calculate the effect size was usually the pooled standard deviation of both tlie aroused condition and the nonaroused condition. When neither the cell standard deviations nor the results of a specific F or t test were reported, the standard deviation for the overall sample was used. This standard deviation was corrected for the difference between the means to make it equivalent to a pooled standard deviation.
2
In addition to estimates of effect size, estimates of effect size heterogeneity (Q) were also calculated. A within-group Q (Q w ) represents the variability of effect size magnitude within a particular category. A large or significant Q w indicates that there is variability among effect size magnitudes within a particular category and suggests that an undetected variable or variables may be influencing effect sizes. A between-groups Q iQb) represents the variability of the mean weighted effect size estimates for each category. A large or significant Q h indicates that two or more of the mean weighted effect size estimates for each category differed in magnitude (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) .
Theoretical Moderators of Effect Size Magnitude
The procedure associated with each effect size was coded on the following four dimensions: (a) The source of the arousal was ambiguous or unambiguous; (b) targets were of high attractiveness, average attractiveness, low attractiveness, or not reported; (c) arousal type was fear arousal, aerobic arousal, sexual arousal, or other; and (d) either targets were the opposite sex of the participant, targets were the same sex as the participant, the participant group mixed males and females but the target remained male or female, or the target sex was unknown to the participant. Two individuals coded each experiment independently. There was no disagreement between the coders.
Maintenance of Independent Effect Sizes
Entering effect sizes for multiple dependent measures within a single experiment violates statistical independence (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . If multiple dependent measures are correlated, entering multiple effect sizes accords excessive weight to that particular effect. For example, suppose that strong effect sizes were obtained for two similar dependent measures in Experiment A, whereas a small effect size was obtained for one dependent measure in Experiment B. Entering all effect sizes would weight the effect obtained in Experiment A more than the effect obtained in Experiment B. To maintain independence, we placed the dependent measures associated with each effect size in one of three categories: romantic attraction, physical attractiveness, and liking. If a particular experiment used two or more dependent measures within one dependent measure category (e.g., two measures of romantic attraction), those measures were averaged. Consequently, effects were entered only once within any dependent measure category. Each category was analyzed independently, which assured that all effect sizes received equal weight once they were adjusted for sample size.
3 2 A minority of effect sizes was simply reported as nonsignificant (e.g., p > .05). We entered a null effect (d+ = 0.00) for those effect sizes. Using this procedure, five null effects were entered within the dependent measure of romantic attraction, two null effects were entered within the dependent measure of physical attractiveness, and nine null effects were entered within the dependent measure of liking. We believed that any potential bias created by entering null effects for nonsignificant effect sizes was minimal. Some effects based on insufficient data were taken from the article. In this article, attractionbased means were reported for the aroused and nonaroused conditions, but all Fs for the attraction measures were reported as less than one. However an inspection of the means revealed that the differences obtained between aroused groups and nonaroused groups were accurately represented by entering null effects. The difference between the aroused condition and nonaroused conditions (as indicated by the means or averaged means) was -0.05 in Experiment 2 (9-point scale), -0.10 in Experiment 3 (5-point scale), and 0.30 in Experiment 4 (7-point scale) for measures of romantic attraction. For measures of liking, these differences were 0.30 for Experiment 2 (9-point scale), -0.30 for Experiment 3 (5-point scale), and 0.30 for Experiment 4 (7-point scale). In Experiment 1 there was no measure of romantic attraction, and the mean liking for both conditions was 6.7. These effect sizes are extremely small and vary around zero. Assuming that these effect sizes are legitimately represented by null effects, only a small minority of effect sizes (2 of 21 for romantic attraction, 2 of 19 for physical attractiveness, and 6 of 38 for liking) might be weakly misrepresented by estimating an already small effect size as a null effect. Nonetheless, we further examined the potential for bias by conducting the same analyses excluding these effect sizes. The pattern of results remained the same. 3 We considered multiple experiments published in the same article as independent. Arguably, experiments published in the same article may not be independent, because they use similar procedures. However, this type of nonindependence occurs similarly in experiments published in different articles. It is common for researchers to use similar methods or replicate previous research (see Allen et al., 1989 , Experiment 1; Dutton & Aron, 1974, Experiment 3; Kenrick, Cialdini, &Linder, 1979) . Consequently, we considered any experiment that used a novel sample Note, k = number of effect sizes; d+ = effect size magnitude; CI = confidence interval; Q w = observed variance in study effect sizes. *p < .05. **;? < .01.
Results Table 1 displays the overall effect of arousal on attraction for each dependent measure. Arousal exerted a small positive effect (Cohen, 1969) on romantic attraction, physical attractiveness, and liking for targets. Table 1 also shows that there was significant heterogeneity among effect size magnitudes within each dependent measure, supporting further exploration into moderators of the arousal-attraction link.
Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of effect size magnitudes as a function of the number of participants for each effect. The scatterplot roughly resembles a horizontal funnel, indicating that publication bias may be minimal (Light & Pillemer, 1984) . Effect sizes based on a small number of participants have a great deal of variability, whereas effect sizes based on a larger number of participants remain closer to a 0.25 effect size. More important, effect sizes are evenly distributed above and below the 0.25 effect size. A distribution resulting from publication bias would have a paucity of effect sizes less than 0.25 because such studies would be published less frequently. Minimal publication bias in this field is not surprising for two reasons. First, early controversy may have minimized bias by allowing for the publication of null results . Second, many potential moderators have been manipulated within one experiof participants as independent. One experiment (White et al., 1981) used one low-arousal condition and two high-arousal conditions. To maintain independence of effect sizes, the two high-arousal conditions were averaged so that only one effect size from this experiment was entered. ment or across different experiments published in the same article, which makes both significant and nonsignificant effect sizes theoretically interesting.
Potential Moderators
The first moderator examined was arousal source ambiguity. Analyses of arousal source ambiguity were limited because only one experiment (Baron, 1987) used an ambiguous arousal source. Baron demonstrated that participants aroused by high atmospheric negative-ion concentrations reported greater perceived physical attractiveness for same-sex targets than did nonaroused participants when the target was attitudinally similar but not when the target was attitudinally dissimilar. Aroused participants did not differ from nonaroused participants in how much they liked the target.
The remaining experiments used unambiguous arousal sources. Inconsistent with misattribution theory, aroused participants indicated greater romantic attraction (k = 21, d+ = 0.27, confidence interval [CI] = 0.15/0.38), perceived physical attractiveness (k = 17, d+ = 0.16, CI = 0.04/0.29), and liking (k = 36, d+ = 0.14, CI = 0.05/0.23) for targets than did nonaroused participants when the arousal source was unambiguous. Although the low number of effect sizes for ambiguous arousal sources might appear to render meaningless the test of arousal source ambiguity, simple principles of logic show that this is not the case. Misattribution theory suggests that if the arousal source is unambiguous, then misattribution will not occur and arousal will not affect attraction. The results involving unambiguous arousal sources were based upon many effect sizes; these results revealed that arousal enhances attraction even when the arousal source is unambiguous. were obtained for romantic attraction and liking. Compared with nonaroused participants, aroused participants indicated greater romantic attraction and greater liking for targets of high attractiveness, less romantic attraction and less liking for targets of low attractiveness, and they did not differ in romantic attraction or liking for targets of average attractiveness. Compared with nonaroused participants, aroused participants also indicated greater perceived physical attractiveness for targets of high and average attractiveness and marginally less physical attractiveness for targets of low attractiveness (k = 2, d+ = -0.38, 90% CI = -O.70/-O.O5). In addition, Table 2 shows that tests of variability among categorical effect size estimates, Q h , were significant for all dependent measures, indicating that target attractiveness moderated significantly the effect of arousal on attraction.
Because effect sizes associated with targets of low attractiveness are markedly reversed, these effect sizes could influence tests of other moderators in two ways. First, effect size estimates would appear weaker due to the inclusion of effects involving unattractive targets. Second, it is possible that target attractiveness correlates with other moderating variables and thereby acts as a confound. For these reasons, effect sizes using unattractive targets were excluded from further analyses. The modified effect size estimates indicate that arousal has a greater effect on attraction than previous results indicated. Arousal has a small to moderate positive effect on romantic attraction (k = 17, d + = 0.37, CI = 0.25/0.49) and a small positive effect on both perceived physical attractiveness (k -17, d+ -0.22, CI = 0.09/0.35) and liking (k = 36, d+ = 0.16, CI = 0.07/0.25) (Cohen, 1969) . rized by arousal type. Consistent with all three theories, participants aroused by fear indicated greater romantic attraction, perceived physical attractiveness, and liking for targets than did nonaroused participants. Inconsistent with negative-reinforcement theory, participants aroused by aerobic exercise also indicated greater romantic attraction and liking than did nonaroused participants. When arousal was induced by sexual material, results were less consistent. Participants aroused by sexual material indicated greater perceived physical attractiveness for targets than did nonaroused participants, but did not indicate greater romantic attraction or liking. Participants aroused by other means indicated greater romantic attraction but did not indicate greater perceived physical attractiveness or liking than did nonaroused participants. Table 4 displays effect size estimates for effect sizes categorized by target sex. Consistent with all three theories, aroused participants indicated greater romantic attraction and perceived physical attractiveness for opposite-sex targets than did nonaroused participants. Inconsistent with negative-reinforcement theory, aroused participants did not indicate greater perceived physical attractiveness or liking for same-sex targets than did nonaroused participants. Furthermore, aroused participants did not indicate greater perceived physical attractiveness or liking when the participant sample consisted of men and women but the target was always male or female. Aroused participants also did not indicate greater perceived physical attractiveness or liking when the sex of the target was unknown to participants (e.g., when the target was evaluated based on an attitude profile).
Excluding Potential Confounds
It is possible that the moderating variables covary and therefore are confounded. Tn such cases, the effects of one moderating Note. Q b = the difference in magnitude of the mean weighted effect size of the categories; k = the number of effect sizes; d+ = the effect size magnitude; CI = confidence interval; Q w = the observed variance in study effect sizes. Effect sizes that used unattractive targets were omitted. *p < .05. **p < .01.
variable will affect tests of another moderating variable. Arousal source ambiguity may be ruled out as a potential confound because there is no evidence that it moderated the effect of arousal on attraction. Target attractiveness moderated the effect of arousal on attraction, but its potential as a confound was minimized by excluding effect sizes that used targets of low attractiveness. The results demonstrated that target sex and arousal type both moderated the effect of arousal on attraction at least to some degree. Consequently, we conducted analyses within levels of these variables to examine if results remained consistent with our overall results. Opposite-sex targets. When only effect sizes involving opposite-sex targets were included, the results were consistent with our overall results (effect size estimates for romantic attraction are not reported because all experiments that measured romantic attraction used only opposite-sex targets). Compared with nonaroused participants, aroused participants indicated greater perceived physical attractiveness and liking for opposite-sex targets when arousal was fear-based (for physical attractiveness, k = 8, </+ = 0.18, CI = 0.00/0.36; for liking, k = 12, d + = 0.25, CI = 0.10/0.40) or aerobically based (no effect sizes for physical attractiveness; for liking, k = 3, d+ = 0.34, CI = 0.11 / 0.57). When arousal was sexually based, aroused participants indicated greater perceived physical attractiveness for targets than did nonaroused participants (k = 4, d + -0.35, CI = 0.11/0.59) but did not indicate greater liking for targets (k -2, d+ = 0.18, CI = -0.26/0.62), in part due to the small number of effect sizes.
Fear-based arousal. Previous analyses included all types of arousal induction. It is possible that negative-reinforcement theory does not apply to non-fear-based forms of arousal induction but does, however, explain the effect of fear-based arousal on attraction. To provide a rigorous test of negative-reinforcement theory and investigate further the possibility of confounds, target sex was examined within effect sizes that used fear-based arousal (again, effect size estimates for romantic attraction are not reported because all experiments that measured romantic attraction used opposite-sex targets).
Participants aroused by fear indicated greater perceived physical attractiveness and liking for opposite-sex targets than did nonaroused participants. These effect size estimates are the same as those reported for fear-based arousal in the opposite-sex targets section (for perceived physical attractiveness, k -8, d+ = 0.18, CI = 0.00/0.36; for liking, k = 12, d+ = .25, CI = 0.10/0.40). Participants aroused by fear did not indicate significantly greater perceived physical attractiveness (k = 1, d+ = 0.05, CI = -0.46/0.57) or liking (k = 3, d+ --0.35, CI = -0.78/0.06) for same-sex targets than did nonaroused participants. Finally, when both men and women composed the participant group, participants aroused by fear did not indicate greater perceived physical attractiveness (k = 2, d+ = 0.21, CI = -0.23/0.65) or liking (jfc = 2, d+ = 0.05, CI = -0.39/0.49) for targets than did nonaroused participants. Tests of variability among categorical effect size estimates were significant for measures of liking, Q b (2) = 7.31, p < .05, but were not significant for measures of perceived physical attractiveness, Q b {2) = 0.36, p > .05. Although these results may be partially influenced by the small number of effect sizes in some categories, these results are consistent with the results obtained when all effect sizes are included and suggest that the moderating variables are not confounded.
Discussion
We conducted the meta-analysis to achieve three goals. The first goal was to examine the magnitude of the effect of arousal on attraction. The results indicate that the effect of arousal on attraction is small to moderate (Cohen, 1969) when targets are of average to high attractiveness. The second goal was to determine which variables moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. The results indicate that arousal affects attraction regardless of arousal source ambiguity and, to some extent, arousal type. The results also indicate that arousal increases attraction to targets of high attractiveness but decreases attraction to targets of low attractiveness. Finally, the results indicate that arousal increases attraction to opposite-sex targets but not to same-sex targets. The third goal was to determine which theory is best supported by the meta-analytic results. This issue is addressed in the following paragraphs.
Negative Reinforcement Theory
The results indicate that negative-reinforcement theory does not explain adequately the effect of arousal on attraction. Three out of four moderating variables produced results that were inconsistent with predictions based on negative-reinforcement theory (see Figure 1) . The most notable inconsistency involved arousal type. Although negative-reinforcement theory suggests that only fear-based arousal will affect attraction, both fearbased arousal and aerobically based arousal increased attraction to targets. Sexually based arousal increased the physical attractiveness of targets but did not affect romantic attraction or liking for targets, suggesting that arousal type moderated the effect of arousal on attraction in some cases. However, the demonstration that both fear-based and aerobically based arousal affected attraction is of primary theoretical relevance and suggests that it is arousal per se that increases attraction. Therefore, arousal type does not seriously moderate the effect of arousal on attraction.
Negative-reinforcement theory was also inconsistent with results involving target attractiveness and target sex. First, arousal increased participants' attraction to targets of high attractiveness but decreased attraction to targets of low attractiveness. Second, arousal increased attraction to opposite-sex targets but not to same-sex targets. This result was replicated when only effect sizes that used fear-based arousal were included.
It is possible that, consistent with negative-reinforcement theory, fear-based arousal increased attraction to female targets but not to male targets because female targets were greater sources of comfort. This possibility could explain the moderating effect of target sex because most of the experiments examined in the meta-analysis used male participants and female targets. However, three observations cast doubt on this possibility. First, tests of the other moderators did not support negative-reinforcement theory. Second, research conducted by Dienstbier (1979, Experiment 3 ) demonstrated that women aroused by fear experienced greater attraction to a male target than did women who were not aroused. Finally, research examining fear and affiliation (Schachter, 1959; Wrightsman, 1960) did not predict, or report, any effects based on the sex of targets.
Misattribution Theory and Response-Facilitation Theory
In contrast to negative-reinforcement theory, the results generally supported both misattribution theory (Dutton & Aron, 1974) and response-facilitation theory (Allen et al. ,1989) . Both theories predicted correctly the moderating effects of target attractiveness and target sex. Both theories also predicted correctly that arousal type would not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction. Misattribution theory and response-facilitation theory differed only in their predictions regarding arousal source ambiguity.
Misattribution theory, in its strong form, cannot explain how arousal can affect attraction when the arousal source is unambiguous. 4 To review, misattribution theory is based on Schachter's theory of emotion (1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) , which suggests that only ambiguous arousal will be misattributed to an incorrect source. Response-facilitation theory fares better than misattribution theory only because it suggests that arousal affects attraction without individuals engaging in a causal analysis regarding arousal. Response-facilitation theory predicts correctly that arousal source ambiguity does not moderate the effect of arousal on attraction (i.e., that arousal can affect attraction even when the arousal source is unambiguous), although one might argue that the ambiguity of the arousal source would influence the type of dominant response made. Response-facilitation theory can also explain the results obtained for other potential moderators by assuming the existence of particular dominant responses. Unfortunately, the basis for these assumptions has not been fully explicated.
Clearly, arousal source ambiguity is of central importance to understanding the arousal-attraction link. Response-facilitation theory suggests that unambiguous arousal sources will not preclude the effect of arousal on attraction. Misattribution theory suggests that unambiguous arousal sources will preclude the effect of arousal on attraction. In the meta-analysis, we examined experiments containing arousal manipulations. In most experiments, the arousal sources were unambiguous (e.g., anticipating strong electric shocks). One experiment (Baron, 1987) used an ambiguous arousal source, increased negative-ion concentrations in the atmosphere. In contrast to the variance of arousal source ambiguity in different experiments, three experiments (Allen et al., 1989, Experiment 2; Gold, Ryckman, & Mosley, 1984; White & Kight, 1984) manipulated explicitly the ambiguity of the arousal source when participants were aroused. These three experiments are reviewed below. Gold, Ryckman, and Mosley (1984, Experiment 2) found that arousal exerted a stronger effect on attraction when the arousal source was greater in ambiguity. In the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition, a female experimenter wore a laboratory coat and informed male participants that she would draw their blood. In the high-arousal-source-ambiguity condition, the female experimenter did not wear a laboratory coat and told participants that another person would draw their blood. Following this manipulation, participants interacted with a female confederate and subsequently indicated their attraction for the confederate. Participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition indicated less attraction to the target than did participants in the higharousal-source-ambiguity condition. White and Kight (1984) also found that arousal exerted a stronger effect on attraction when the arousal source was greater in ambiguity. Participants ran in place for 15 s (low arousal) or for 120 s (high arousal). Next, participants wore a blood pressure cuff in the exercise room with a jump rope hanging conspicuously on the wall (low arousal source ambiguity) or had the cuff removed and were taken to another room (high arousal source ambiguity). Finally, participants expected to meet the attractive female target after viewing her on videotape (high confederate salience) or did not expect to meet the female target (low confederate salience). Aroused participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition indicated less attraction to the target than did aroused participants in the higharousal-source-ambiguity condition, but only when the confederate was highly salient. The manipulation of arousal source ambiguity did not exert any significant effects when participants were not aroused or when the confederate was not salient. Allen et al. (1989) criticized the White and Kight findings by noting that participants in the high-arousal-source-ambiguity condition may have experienced a delay of 15-20 s before their attraction to the target was measured. Consequently, at the time attraction was measured, participants in the low-arousal-sourceambiguity condition may have been more aroused than participants in the high-arousal-source-ambiguity condition. Allen and his colleagues argued that greater levels of arousal may have moved participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition beyond the optimal performance point on the arousal-performance function (Duffy, 1957; Malmo, 1959) , or shifted their response hierarchy so that monitoring their own physiological state was the dominant response rather than being attracted to the target. In essence, participants in the low-arousal-sourceambiguity condition may have exhibited decreased attraction to the target not because unambiguous arousal sources prevent the misattribution of arousal, but because being overaroused may inhibit the effect of arousal on attraction.
Research Manipulating Arousal Source Ambiguity
There are several problems with this criticism of White and Kight's research (1984) . First, the results obtained in the metaanalysis demonstrate convincingly that increased arousal results in increased attraction to attractive targets, such as the target used by White and Kight (1984) . Second, research on excitation-transfer theory (Cantor, Zillman, & Bryant, 1975) suggests that arousal dissipates over the course of minutes, not in 15-20 s (or less). Finally, White and Kight (1984) demonstrated that reduced arousal source ambiguity decreased the effect of arousal on attraction when the confederate was highly salient but not when the confederate was less salient. If this effect was due only to the ' 'overarousal'' of participants in the low-arousalsource-ambiguity condition, the manipulation of arousal source ambiguity should have been effective regardless of the confederate's salience.
Allen and his colleagues (1989, Experiment 2) used a procedure similar to that used by White and Kight (1984) . One exception was that participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition were provided with numerous reminders about exercising before indicating their attraction to the target. The manipulation of arousal source ambiguity did not exert a significant effect. However, it is important to note that participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition reported marginally greater levels of arousal on a manipulation check than did participants in the high-arousal-source-ambiguity condition.
Summary
These experiments provide moderate evidence that arousal affects attraction more strongly when arousal sources are ambiguous. In two of three experiments (Gold et al., 1984; White & Kight, 1984) , aroused participants were more attracted to the target when the arousal source was greater in ambiguity. Allen and his colleagues (1989) found no effect for arousal source ambiguity, biit interpretation of this result is problematic because arousal level did not remain consistent across levels of arousal source ambiguity.
Taken together, these results suggest two inconsistencies in the arousal and attraction literature that need to be addressed. First, if research that manipulated arousal source ambiguity suggests that ambiguous, rather than unambiguous, arousal affects attraction most strongly, why does the meta-analysis demonstrate convincingly that arousal affects attraction even when arousal sources are unambiguous? Second, why were experimental manipulations of arousal source ambiguity effective in some cases (Gold et al., 1984; White & Kight, 1984 , highconfederate-salience condition) but not others (Allen et al., 1989; White & Kight, 1984 , low-confederate-salience condition)? We present a new model of arousal and attraction that accounts for these seemingly inconsistent results, as well as for the results obtained in the meta-analysis.
A T\vo-Stage Theory of Arousal and Attraction:
Judgment and Adjustment
The judgment and adjustment model is presented in Figure  3 . According to our model, arousal is hypothesized to have an automatic effect on attraction that is independent of factors associated with the attribution of arousal, such as arousal source ambiguity. This first stage occurs in large part because evaluations of attraction occur automatically and are comparable to the "characterization" stage described by Gilbert (1989) . Following this "judgment" stage, individuals may become aware that their attraction to the target was influenced by their arousal level. Such individuals may adjust their attraction judgment if they are motivated to accurately assess their level of attraction to the target and are cognitively capable of doing so. This adjustment stage is evident in the effects obtained in some experiments that manipulated arousal source ambiguity (Gold et al., 1984; White & Kight, 1984) and is comparable to Gilbert's (1989) ' 'correction*' stage. This model is similar to other models incorporating automatic and controlled stages to explain how individuals form social inferences (Gilbert, 1989) , apply stereotypes (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Devine, 1989; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Pratto & Bargh, 1991) , and attribute mood (Ottati & Isbell, 1996) .
Stage 1: Judgment
Recent research has demonstrated that many psychological processes occur automatically. That is, many psychological processes occur efficiently and without the perceiver's awareness, intention, or control (Bargh, 1994) . For example, automatic judgments have been postulated in regard to stereotypes (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994) and trait inferences (Gilbert, 1989; Newman & Uleman, 1989) . The results of the meta-analysis suggest similarly that arousal affects attraction automatically. In particular, arousal affects attraction even when low-arousal-source-ambiguity should make individuals aware of the true source of their arousal. For example, Dienstbier (1979) demonstrated that the induction of arousal affected attraction immediately, even when arousal was induced by "the suddenness of the 35-degree tilt [in a dental chair] and the accompanying noise of a 4-pound brass plate dropping onto a steel plate on the floor" (p. 207). Response-facilitation theory provides one explanation for the effect of arousal on attraction by describing how arousal facilitates particular dominant responses without any causal analysis. However, it will be useful to examine possible explanations for the dominant responses before response-facilitation theory can be accepted completely as an explanation of how arousal affects attraction.
Misattribution theory may also describe a process that explains the automatic effect of arousal on attraction. Several studies have demonstrated that evaluation can occur automatically (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh, Litt, Pratto, & Spielman, 1989; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) . Attraction is largely an evaluative process, because it involves relatively simple inferences about a target person. At the moment evaluation occurs, heightened physiological arousal may be used as information and thereby exacerbate feelings of attraction and aversion. This alternative explanation is consistent with Dutton and Aron's (1974) reasoning that arousal will affect attraction even when the arousal source is unambiguous. This explanation is also analogous to mood-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990) . However, * 'arousal as information" differs importantly from both a strong interpretation of misattribution theory and moodas-information theory. Unlike these two theories, the arousalas-information explanation suggests that the efficiency of a welldeveloped psychological process allows arousal, or mood, to be used as information even when it is not ambiguous.
Several other theories also provide insight into the automatic effect of arousal on attraction. Arousal may be associated with boundary-breaking, or self-expanding, experiences (Aron & Aron, 1996) . Another possibility is that arousal and attraction are linked in an associative network. Bower (1981) suggests that emotions are units in an associative network which has linkages with behaviors, beliefs, events, and themes. If arousal is represented as a node in such a network, the experience of arousal may activate cues associated with high and low attractiveness in members of the opposite sex. Such links could be the result of a state-dependent learning process (Clark, Milberg, & Ross, 1983 ; see Ucros, 1989) in which arousal is associated with attraction to attractive members of the opposite sex and repulsion from unattractive members of the opposite sex. Gilbert (1989) described how, following an automatic characterization of a particular target, individuals may correct their characterization on the basis of situational factors. Research has demonstrated that individuals can correct similarly for the influence of stereotypes (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Devine, 1989; Pratto & Bargh, 1991) and for the effects of mood (Ottati & Isbell, 1996) . Likewise, individuals who recognize that arousal has affected their attraction to the target may consequently adjust their level of attraction to members of the opposite sex. This adjustment stage is a controlled process to the extent that it occurs inefficiently and requires the perceived s awareness, intention, and control (Bargh, 1994) . Accordingly, adjustment will take place as long as perceivers are (a) aware that arousal has affected their level of attraction, (b) motivated to accurately assess their level of attraction, and (c) cognitivcly capable of adjusting attraction to compensate for the influence of arousal. However, individuals are unlikely to discount completely the extent to which arousal has affected their attraction (Jones & Harris, 1967 ). As Figure 3 shows, when targets are of high or low attractiveness, perceivers reduce the extremity of their attraction ratings, but not to a baseline (i.e., prearousal) level. In this context, the adjustment process creates results consistent with manipulations of arousal source ambiguity. However, it also predicts that arousal will polarize attraction to some degree regardless of arousal source ambiguity.
Stage 2: Adjustment
The judgment and adjustment model also explains the variability within experiments that used aroused participants and manipulated arousal source ambiguity. In Gold, Ryckman, and Mosley's (1984) experiment and in the high confederate (i.e., target) salience condition of White and Kight's (1984) experiment, arousal exerted a stronger effect on attraction when arousal sources were made greater in ambiguity. Under these conditions, aroused participants met, or expected to meet, the female target. These participants were likely motivated to form an accurate assessment of attraction and may have adjusted attraction ratings when arousal sources were unambiguous. Conversely, in White and Kight's low confederate (i.e., target) salience condition, arousal affected attraction regardless of arousal source ambiguity. Under these conditions, participants did not expect to meet the target and were probably less motivated to form an accurate assessment of attraction. The additional cues provided about the arousal source in the low-arousal-sourceambiguity condition were not sufficient to cause participants in this condition to adjust their attraction downward.
Allen and his colleagues (1989) obtained a null effect for an arousal source ambiguity manipulation, despite having used a procedure almost identical to the procedure used in White and Kight's (1984) high-confederate-salience condition. An important difference between these procedures is that Allen and his colleagues (1989) used a stronger manipulation of arousal source ambiguity. Following the manipulation, participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition reported marginally greater levels of arousal than participants in the high-arousalsource-ambiguity condition. According to the judgment and adjustment model of arousal and attraction, the greater arousal felt by participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition caused them to experience greater attraction to the target than that experienced by participants in the high-arousal-sourceambiguity condition. In addition, participants in the lowarousal-source-ambiguity condition would also be more likely to recognize the influence of arousal and adjust their attraction downward. If participants in the low-arousal-source-ambiguity condition experienced greater initial attraction to the target, this downward adjustment would make their level of attraction comparable to the level of attraction experienced by participants in the high-arousal-source-ambiguity condition.
An Experiment Demonstrating Adjustment
We conducted an experiment to test the adjustment stage of the judgment and adjustment model. The judgment and adjustment model suggests that individuals who are (a) aware of the influence of arousal, (b) motivated to form an accurate assessment of attraction, and (c) cognitively capable of accounting for the influence of arousal will discount the effect of arousal on attraction. In this experiment, we manipulated cognitive capability for participants who were aroused by an unambiguous arousal source. Tn addition, we motivated participants to form an accurate assessment of attraction to a member of the opposite sex. The judgment and adjustment model predicts that cognitively busy participants will indicate more extreme ratings of attraction than non-cognitively-busy participants.
Method Participants and Design
Forty male undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were recruited through the psychological participant pool for an experiment entitled "Exercise, Physiology, and Judgment." All participants received partial course credit in return for their participation. The design included a distraction condition and a nondistraction condition. Twenty participants were randomly assigned to each condition.
Procedure and Materials
Participants went through the procedure individually. A female experimenter asked participants to step up and down a 6-in. step for 2 min. After exercising, the experimenter seated participants and gave them two questionnaires and two photographs, each portraying a female target. The experimenter asked participants to observe each photograph and respond to the attached questionnaire. Tb maintain low arousal source ambiguity across conditions, the experimenter reminded all participants that they had just finished exercising. To maintain high motivation to assess the target's attractiveness, the experimenter asked participants to be as accurate as possible when making their evaluations. At this point, we introduced the distraction manipulation. The experimenter asked participants in the distraction condition to remember a seven-digit number while making judgments. Participants in the nondistraction condition proceeded directly to evaluating the two female targets.
Stimuli. Each female was presented individually in a color photograph (head only), obtained from the archives of a local photographer.
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Photograph A presented a Caucasian woman of average attractiveness with strawberry blond hair. Photograph B presented a Caucasian woman of average attractiveness with brown hair. Participants did not receive any additional information about the women in the photographs. We used two photographs to verify that the effect of distraction was robust and occurred for more than one target. The order of the photographs was counterbalanced.
Dependent measures. Participants responded to five questions for each female target. These questions, or some variant of these questions, have been used commonly in the arousal and attraction literature (e.g., Allen et al., 1989; Dutton & Aron, 1974; Riordan, 1984; Riordan & Tedeschi, 1983; White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981; White & Kight, 1984) . The Cronbach's alphas for these measures were .89 (Photograph A) and .83 (Photograph B). Later we examine specifically the effect of distraction on romantic attraction (i.e., the items tapping physical attractiveness, dating, and kissing; for Photographs A and B, Cronbach's alphas were .84 and .83, respectively) and nonromantic measures (i.e., the items tapping liking and desire to work with the target; for Photographs A and B, Cronbach's alphas were .76 and ,67, respectively).
Results and Discussion
According to the judgment and adjustment model, aroused participants who are motivated and cognitively capable will exhibit less polarized attraction ratings than cognitively busy participants, because distraction should interfere with the ability to account for the influence of arousal. To test this hypothesis, we constructed a measure of polarization by calculating the deviation of each participant's score for each dependent measure from the midpoint of the scale (5.5) and averaging the deviations for each photograph. This procedure is consistent with research on attitude polarization that has investigated factors influencing the polarization of evaluations around a neutral midpoint (Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Liberman & Chaiken, 1991; Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser & Leone, 1977) .
Why is this measure of polarization suitable? First, it is each participant's subjective experience of attraction that will determine whether arousal will increase or decrease attraction. If the participant considers the target to be attractive, arousal will cause the participant to perceive the target to be more attractive; if the participant considers the target to be unattractive, arousal will cause the participant to perceive the target to be less attractive. Second, polarization should occur around the midpoint because the midpoint of the scale represents a neutral point between very attracted and not at all attracted. In contrast to the midpoint, the average rating on each scale does not necessarily represent neutral attractiveness because participants may have rated the target, on average, as somewhat attractive or somewhat unattractive.
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on these transformed ratings of attraction. Distraction (distraction vs. no distraction) and order (Photograph A first vs. Photograph B first) served as between-subjects variables, whereas photograph (Photograph A vs. Photograph B) served as a within-subject variable. 6 Composite polarization scores for each photograph served as the dependent measure. Order was not involved in any main effects or interactions and therefore was dropped from analyses. An ANOVA using only the distraction and photograph variables revealed a main effect for distraction, F(l, 38) = 6.14, p < .05. Consistent with the judgment and adjustment model, distracted participants exhibited more polarized ratings of attraction (for Photograph A, M = 2.24; for Photograph B, M = 2.26) than did nondistracted participants (for Photograph A, M = 1.64; for Photograph B. M = 1.68). (Means represent the average absolute difference between the participant's rating of attraction and the midpoint of the scale.) These results.-suggest that participants may correct for the automatic influence of arousal and that such correction is inhibited when cognitive resources are limited.
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Further analyses investigated the effect of distraction on romantic attraction and nonromantic attraction. We constructed a romantic attraction measure by averaging the deviations of participants' scores from the midpoint for the dependent measures tapping physical attractiveness, dating, and kissing. The romantic attraction measure combined the romantic attraction items and the physical attractiveness items for two reasons. First, as we noted earlier, romantic attraction and physical attractiveness appear to be closely related (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986) . Second, when unattractive targets were excluded from the meta-analysis, the results demonstrated that arousal increased romantic attraction and perceived physical attractiveness more strongly than liking. We also constructed a parallel nonromantic attraction measure from dependent measures tapping liking and working with the target. These polarized measures correlated significantly (for Photograph A, r = .77, p < .01; for Photograph B, r = .60, p < .05).
An ANOVA using the distraction and photograph variables performed on the romantic attraction measure revealed a significant effect of distraction, F( 1, 38) = 7.87, p < .01. Distracted participants exhibited more polarized romantic attraction (for Photograph A, M = 2.50; for Photograph B, M = 2.49) than did nondistracted participants (for Photograph A, M = 1.68; for Photograph B, M = 1.73). In contrast, the same AN-OVA performed on the nonromantic attraction measures did not reveal a significant effect of distraction, F(\, 38) = .89, ns, although distracted participants indicated somewhat greater polarized liking for the target (for Photograph A, M = 1.85; for Photograph B, M -1.90) than did nondistracted participants (for Photograph A, M = 1.58; for Photograph B, M = 1.60).
We proceeded to examine the influence of distraction on romantic attraction and nonromantic attraction more rigorously. First, we entered distraction, photograph, and dependent measure (i.e., romantic attraction vs. nonromantic attraction) into an ANOW If distraction exerts a greater effect on romantic attraction than on nonromantic attraction, the results should have demonstrated an interaction between distraction and the type of dependent measure. Although the pattern of means was in the predicted direction, it did not reach significance, F{ 1, 38) = 2.11,p = .15. Second, we examined the effect of distraction on attraction using either romantic attraction or nonromantic attraction as the dependent measure and the remaining variable as a covariate. The polarizing effect of distraction on romantic attraction remained significant even when the nonromantic attraction measures from both photographs were added to the ANOVA as covariates, F(l, 36) = 6.44, p < .05. In contrast, there continued to be no polarizing effect of distraction on nonromantic attraction even when the romantic attraction measures from both photographs were added to the ANOVA as covariates, F( 1, 36) = 0.004, ns. Together, these results suggest that distraction primarily affects romantic attraction. This finding is consistent with the meta-analytic results demonstrating that arousal exerted the strongest effect on romantic attraction.
Although the obtained results are consistent with the proposed adjustment stage of our model, alternative explanations exist. First, the female experimenter could have been an additional k The aggregated polarized attraction measure for Photograph A and for Photograph B correlated significantly (r = .49, p < .001).
7 Although the examination of polarization was based on the midpoint of the scale for theoretical reasons, we acknowledge that the effect of distraction on polarization may be examined by comparing the standard deviations of attraction in the distraction condition and the nondistraction condition. Consistent with our predictions, the standard deviations obtained in the distraction condition (for Photograph A, M = 4.75, SD = 2.00; for Photograph B, M = 5.27, SO = 2.01) were greater than those obtained in the nondistraction condition (for Photograph A, M = 5.54, SD = 1.73; for Photograph B, M = 5.18, SD = 1.58). Although the differences between the standard deviations obtained in the distraction condition and the nondistraction condition were not statistically significant, the failure to reach significance was not inconsistent with our model. Our model predicted without exception lhat distraction will result in more extreme ratings of attraction around a midpoint of average, or neutral, attractiveness. Comparisons of standard deviations examine the dispersion of scores around the mean. The mean in this case is similar to the midpoint, but a critical distinction remains. For ratings that occur between the mean and the midpoint, our model predicts that distraction will move scores toward the mean. This effect would actually decrease the standard deviations obtained in the distraction condition. This discrepancy between the two forms of measuring dispersion is likely to account for the failure of the comparison of standard deviations to reach statistical significance. source of arousal for the male participants. However, any additional arousal caused by the female experimenter would have been consistent across conditions. Second, participants could have perceived the female experimenter as a source of arousal and attributed their arousal to her rather than to the target. However, this effect would also have been consistent across conditions. Even if participants in one condition were more likely to attribute arousal to the female experimenter, the consequences would have been minimal, considering that the meta-analysis demonstrated that potential explanations for a participant's arousal (i.e., unambiguous arousal sources) do not prevent arousal from influencing attraction. Furthermore, Riordan and Tedeschi (1983) demonstrated an effect of arousal on attraction using male participants, a female experimenter, and a female target. Finally, it is possible that the distraction task was an additional source of arousal. However, this explanation also appears unlikely. Although the distraction task was cognitively taxing, it remained relatively easy. All 20 participants in the distraction condition remembered the seven-digit number.
General Discussion
The goal of this paper was to better understand the link between arousal and attraction. To this end, we conducted a metaanalytic review of the arousal and attraction literature and reported the results of one experiment. Although each of these information sources may be subject to criticism individually, together their results converge on a coherent picture of the arousal-attraction link.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, the results obtained in the meta-analysis verified that under typical experimental conditions, arousal exerts a small to moderate effect on attraction. Second, the meta-analytic results indicate that arousal increases attraction to attractive opposite-sex targets and decreases attraction to unattractive opposite-sex targets. This effect occurs regardless of arousal source ambiguity. For the romantic attraction measures alone, 21 effect sizes representing 1,232 participants demonstrate clearly that arousal facilitates attraction even when arousal sources are unambiguous. Third, the examination of moderators of the arousal-attraction link has implications for the three primary arousal-attraction theories. Negative-reinforcement theory is inconsistent with the results obtained in the meta-analysis, whereas response-facilitation theory generally is consistent with the results. Misattribution theory also can be interpreted as.consistent with the results obtained in the meta-analysis if the theory is understood as an automatic process rather than as the conscious, attributional process described by Schachter (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) . Finally, a review of three experiments demonstrated that in some cases, making the source of arousal less ambiguous attenuates the effect of arousal on attraction.
A judgment and adjustment model was proposed to provide a framework for understanding the results obtained in the metaanalysis and experiments that manipulated arousal source ambiguity. Briefly, our model posits that enhanced arousal will affect attraction automatically (i.e., judgment) and that individuals who are aware of this influence and are motivated appropriately may subsequently correct for this effect of arousal (i.e., adjustment). By postulating an automatic effect of arousal on attraction, the model accounts for the effect of unambiguous arousal on attraction. By postulating an adjustment, or correction, process, the model accounts for the effects obtained when arousal source ambiguity was manipulated. Our experiment used a manipulation designed to interfere with the proposed adjustment process. As expected, distraction caused participants to exhibit more extreme ratings of attraction, particularly for romantic attraction. Taken together, the reviewed experiments that manipulated arousal source ambiguity and the experiment provide converging evidence of an adjustment process.
Implications and Conclusion
Who would have guessed that such an ostensibly simple phenomenon-a man crossing a scary bridge finds a woman particularly attractive-would spark a quarter century of arousal and attraction research? Clearly, the study of arousal and attraction is about more than a simple environmental effect. Rather, the present research suggests that understanding the arousal-attraction link requires a search for the social cognitive processes underlying affect and judgment. From its beginning as an extension of Schachter's theory (Dutton&Aron, 1974) , the arousalattraction link has been reinterpreted in the context of reinforcement theory (Kenrick & Cialdini, 1977) , response-facilitation theory (Allen et al., 1989) , and, to a lesser extent, state-dependent learning (Clark et al., 1983 ) and self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1996) . Arousal and attraction research represents a dialectic between specific research findings and broader social psychological theory. A particular interpretation of the arousal-attraction link buttresses a broader theoretical framework, and advances in the field of social psychology lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the arousal-attraction link. This dialectic is apparent in our own model, in which we apply contemporary approaches of automatic and controlled processes to the arousal and attraction literature. In so doing, we create a framework for understanding seemingly contradictory results as well as unearth several unanswered questions regarding arousal and attraction. It is our expectation that future research investigating these questions will likewise support and inspire innovative theories of affect and cognition.
